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A Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries
from the Founding Era to Determine
the Original Meaning of
the Constitution
Gregory E. Maggs*
This Article explains how dictionaries published in the Founding Era
may provide evidence of the original meaning of the Constitution.  In addi-
tion, the Article identifies and discusses six potential problems with relying on
definitions from these dictionaries, and cautions that these potential problems
must be considered when using Founding Era dictionaries either to make
claims about the Constitution’s original meaning or to evaluate claims about
original meaning made by others.  Finally, the Article includes an Appendix
describing nine English language dictionaries and four legal dictionaries from
the Founding Era that the Supreme Court has cited in constitutional cases, and
indicates where free versions of these dictionaries can be found online.
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INTRODUCTION
Judges, lawyers, and law professors regularly cite dictionaries
from the Founding Era as evidence of the original meaning of the
Constitution.  For example, in recent Terms, members of the Supreme
Court have quoted dictionaries from the late 1700s in efforts to dis-
cern the original meaning of the word “regulate” in the Commerce
Clause,1 the words “privileges” and “immunities” in the Privileges or
Immunities Clause,2 the word “art” in the Patents Clause,3 the word
“speech” in the First Amendment,4 and the word “arms” in the Sec-
ond Amendment.5  Similarly, during the past five years, in more than
100 law review articles making claims about the original meaning of
the Constitution,6 legal scholars have cited various editions of Samuel
Johnson’s A Dictionary of the English Language, one of the most au-
thoritative eighteenth-century dictionaries.7
Consulting dictionaries from the Founding Era is not a novel aid
to interpretation invented by lawyers and judges solely for the pur-
pose of discerning the original meaning of the Constitution.  Outside
the field of constitutional law, historians regularly use centuries-old
1 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2644 (2012) (joint opinion of
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
2 McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3063–64 & n.2 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
3 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3243 & n.27 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment).
4 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 428 n.55 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
5 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581 (2008) (Scalia, J.).
6 I found more than 100 law review articles by searching Westlaw’s JLR database for
“‘samuel johnson’ /10 dictionary /20 (175! 176! 176! 177! 178! 179!) & date(>1/1/2008).”
7 For one edition of this influential dictionary, see SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, J.F. & C. Rivington et al., 10th ed. 1792), available at http://
books.google.com/books?id=j-UIAAAAQAAJ.  This source does not contain page numbers but
entries are listed alphabetically.  Note that words beginning with the letters I and J are mixed
together, as are words beginning with the letters U and V.
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dictionaries to determine the meaning of words in historic texts.  For
example, Professor Enzo Pesciarelli employed the 1755 edition of
Johnson’s A Dictionary of the English Language to verify what Adam
Smith meant when he used the term “adventurer” in The Wealth of
Nations, which was published in 1776.8  Scholar Philip D. Morgan
looked up the definition of “concubine” in the same dictionary to un-
derstand what Madison Hemings meant when he chose this word to
describe his mother, Sally Hemings, in writing about her relationship
with Thomas Jefferson.9
Yet despite the frequency of their citation, the subject of historic
dictionaries is not generally taught in law school and has not received
much attention from legal scholars.  Accordingly, many judges, law-
yers, law clerks, law professors, and law students may not know very
much about the theory behind using dictionaries from the Founding
Era or about the most common pitfalls in relying on them when mak-
ing claims about the original meaning of the Constitution.  Although a
few scholars have written articles addressing judicial reliance on mod-
ern and historic dictionaries,10 these articles generally do not provide
concrete guidance to writers who wish to use dictionaries to bolster
arguments about the original meaning of the Constitution, or to read-
ers seeking to evaluate such claims made by others.  Judicial decisions
also have not addressed this topic sufficiently.11  This brief Article
seeks to fulfill this limited, but I believe important, function.
In Part I of this Article, I address two preliminary matters.  First,
I define the term “original meaning” of the Constitution to include
8 See Enzo Pesciarelli, Smith, Bentham, and the Development of Contrasting Ideas on En-
trepreneurship, 21 HIST. POL. ECON. 521, 522–23 (1989).
9 See Philip D. Morgan, Interracial Sex in the Chesapeake and the British Atlantic World,
c. 1700–1820, in SALLY HEMINGS & THOMAS JEFFERSON: HISTORY, MEMORY, AND CIVIC CUL-
TURE 52, 75 (Jan Ellen Lewis & Peter S. Onuf eds., 1999).
10 See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme
Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275 (1998); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier & Samuel A. Thumma, Scaling the
Lexicon Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 77 (2010) [hereinafter Kirchmeier & Thumma, Scaling the Lexicon For-
tress]; Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The
United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227 (1999); Samuel A.
Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Remains a Fortress: An Update, 5 GREEN BAG
51 (2001); see also Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1437, 1440 (1994); Rickie Sonpal, Note, Old Dictionaries and New Textualists, 71 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 2177, 2192 (2003).
11 “The [Supreme] Court . . . has never expressly delineated the proper role and use of the
dictionary in American jurisprudence.  The few concepts that the Court has developed over time
appear to be followed inconsistently and irregularly.”  Kirchmeier & Thumma, Scaling the Lexi-
con Fortress, supra note 10, at 82.
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three possible original meanings: the original intent of the Framers,
the original understanding of those who ratified the Constitution, and
the original objective (or public) meaning of the Constitution.  Sec-
ond, I explain with examples how dictionaries from the Founding Era
are usually cited as evidence of the original objective meaning of the
Constitution but how the same dictionaries in fact might provide evi-
dence of each of these three meanings.
In Part II, I then identify and explain, with examples, six common
potential grounds for impeaching claims about the original meaning of
the Constitution that rely on dictionaries from the Founding Era.  For
ease of discussion, I have labeled these grounds (1) insufficiency,
(2) incompleteness, (3) inapplicability, (4) inconsistency, (5) impreci-
sion, and (6) incorrectness.  I do not suggest that one or more of these
problems will weaken every attempt to use dictionaries from the late
1700s to help establish the original meaning of the Constitution.  I do,
however, recommend that anyone relying on dictionaries to make
claims about original meaning—and anyone assessing such claims by
others—should take these grounds into account, and also give practi-
cal advice for avoiding or minimizing each of these potential
problems.
I conclude by predicting that nearly all judicial opinions and
scholarly works attempting to discern the original meaning of the
Constitution soon will refer to these dictionaries as commonly as they
now cite the Federalist Papers, the records of the Federal Constitu-
tional Convention, and other readily available sources of the original
meaning of the Constitution.  In the Appendix to this Article, I then
describe the most commonly cited English language and legal diction-
aries from the Founding Era.  Once viewable only in the libraries of
great universities, various editions of these books are now available
for free in scanned, searchable, digital formats on Google Books (for
which I provide Universal Resource Locators).12
Finally, an important disclaimer is in order.  In this brief Article, I
do not consider and make no claim about whether or to what extent
judges should or should not follow the original meaning of the Consti-
tution when deciding constitutional issues.  I also do not take sides on
the question of which original meaning—the original intent, the origi-
12 Google Books is a free website that contains scanned and searchable copies of millions
of books, especially those for which the copyright has expired. See About Google Books,
GOOGLE BOOKS, http://books.google.com/intl/en/googlebooks/about/indexhtml (last visited Feb.
13, 2014).  Note that books are more easily searched using the Google Chrome browser than the
Internet Explorer browser.
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nal understanding, or the original objective meaning—is most signifi-
cant for construing the Constitution.  These are important questions
that others have discussed at great length and with considerable abil-
ity and controversy.  I do not address them because I believe that
readers of this Article may be interested in knowing the original
meaning of the Constitution as a historical matter regardless of their
views on whether courts should or must follow one or another original
meaning.  To that end, readers may want to know the strengths and
weaknesses of relying on dictionaries from the Founding Era.  (In sep-
arate works, I have attempted to provide guides to other sources of
the original meaning of the Constitution.)13
I. THEORY OF USING DICTIONARIES AS EVIDENCE OF THE
ORIGINAL MEANING
A. Definitions of Original Meaning
The Constitution has at least three distinct types of original
meaning.14  One original meaning—the “original intent of the Fram-
ers”—is the meaning that the deputies to the federal Constitutional
Convention in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 collectively in-
tended the Constitution to have.15  The most common method of de-
termining the original intent is to look at what the deputies said about
the Constitution during debates at the Constitutional Convention.  We
know a fair amount about the deputies’ debates because nine of them
took notes that have survived, and these notes have been carefully
organized and published.16
Another type of original meaning—the original understanding of
the ratifiers—is the collective meaning that the delegates who partici-
pated in the thirteen state ratifying conventions beginning in the fall
13 See supra note * (listing these guides).
14 This paragraph and the following two paragraphs are adapted from very similar
paragraphs in previous guides that I have written in my series of guides to the original meaning.
See Maggs, Guide to the Federal Convention, supra note *, at 1729–30; Maggs, Guide to the
Federalist Papers, supra note *, at 805–07; Maggs, Guide to the State Ratifying Conventions, supra
note *, at 461–63; see also Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 229–31 (1988) (describing
the original intent, original understanding, and original textual meaning as separate original
meanings of the Constitution).  I repeat the points previously made for the convenience of
readers.
15 See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 800–01 (1995) (making con-
clusions about what the “Framers intended” based in part on comments of Alexander Hamilton
regarding the Constitutional Convention).
16 See Maggs, Guide to the Federal Convention, supra note *, at 1737–39.
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of 1787 understood the Constitution to have.17  The original under-
standing of the Constitution so defined may differ from the original
intent of the Framers because the Constitutional Convention met in
secret and its records did not become public until many years after the
ratification of the Constitution.18  As a result, the ratifiers—except for
the few who had participated in the Constitutional Convention19—
could not know exactly what the Framers intended and they may have
attached different meanings to the Constitution.  One way of deter-
mining the original understanding of the ratifiers is to look at what
they said at the state ratifying conventions.20  Another key method of
discerning the original understanding is to consider the arguments
made for and against ratification by Federalists and Anti-Federalists,
on the theory that these arguments may have influenced the ratifiers.21
A third important type of original meaning—the “original objec-
tive meaning” (also known as the “original public meaning”)—is the
reasonable meaning of the text of the Constitution at the time of its
adoption.22  This meaning is not necessarily what the Framers subjec-
tively intended the Constitution to have or what participants at the
ratification debates actually understood it to have, but instead what a
reasonable person of the era would have thought it had.23  It is a hypo-
thetical meaning that someone reading the Constitution around 1787
to 1789 might have understood the document to mean.  This meaning
can be discerned from contemporaneous texts of all kinds, including
but not limited to dictionaries from the Founding Era.24
17 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 716–19 (1999) (discussing evidence of the “origi-
nal understanding” of the ratifiers of the Constitution).
18 See, e.g., Maggs, Guide to the Federal Convention, supra note *, at 1723.
19 One or more of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention participated in each of
the state ratifying conventions, except for Rhode Island, which did not send any delegates to the
Constitutional Convention.  See Maggs, Guide to the State Ratifying Conventions, supra note *, at
481.
20 See id. at 482.
21 See Maggs, Guide to the Federalist Papers, supra note *, at 821–23.  Judge Lawrence
Silberman, for example, has cited the Federalist Papers as key evidence of the original under-
standing because they “were available to the state ratifying conventions.” In re Sealed Case, 838
F.2d 476, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev’d sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
22 See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 100–09 (2004) (describing this kind of meaning).
23 See Maggs, Guide to the Federalist Papers, supra note *, at 806.
24 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI.
L. REV. 101, 111–25 (2001) (using this methodology to determine whether the word “commerce”
in the Commerce Clause refers specifically to the exchange of goods or more broadly to any
gainful activity).
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The original intent, original understanding, and original public
meaning of terms in the Constitution are often the same or very simi-
lar.  Sometimes, however, these three types of original meaning may
differ from one another.  A well-known example concerns Article III,
Section 2, which says that federal courts have subject matter jurisdic-
tion in cases “between a State . . . and foreign States, Citizens or Sub-
jects.”25  According to the Supreme Court, the original objective
meaning of this clause might have been that citizens of one state may
sue another state in federal court.26  But some historic evidence sug-
gests that the Framers did not intend, and the ratifiers did not under-
stand, that citizens of one state could sue another state in federal
court.  At the Virginia ratifying convention, John Marshall urged his
fellow delegates to read the clause in a more limited way, saying, “I
hope that no gentleman will think that a state will be called at the bar
of the federal court . . . . The intent is, to enable states to recover
claims of individuals residing in other states.”27
Writers have debated which type of original meaning should con-
trol interpretation of the Constitution.28  Resolution of this issue is be-
yond the scope of this Article.  Important here is understanding that
different types of original meaning exist and knowing how these dif-
ferent meanings are defined.  The following Section explains how dic-
tionaries from the Founding Era might provide some evidence of each
of these meanings.
B. Original Meanings of the Constitution and Dictionaries from the
Founding Era
When writers consult dictionaries from the Founding Era for the
definition of words used in the Constitution, they are usually seeking
evidence of the original objective meaning (or “public meaning”) of
these words.29  Put another way, they are attempting to discover the
meaning of the words as they were commonly used and commonly
25 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
26 See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 261 (1985) (“The clauses by their
terms permitted federal jurisdiction over any suit between a State and a noncitizen or a State
and an alien, and in particular over suits in which the plaintiff was the noncitizen or alien and the
defendant was the State.”).
27 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 555 (Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott Co., 2d ed. 1891),
quoted in Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 267.
28 See Gregory E. Maggs, Which Original Meaning of the Constitution Matters to Justice
Thomas?, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 494, 500–02 (2009) (identifying differing views on the issue
of which original meaning should control interpretation of the Constitution).
29 See infra notes 30–33 and accompanying text.
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understood; they are not attempting to prove what the Framers sub-
jectively intended the Constitution to mean or what the Constitution’s
ratifiers subjectively understood it to mean.  Their assumption, usually
unstated, is that the dictionaries that they cite accurately provide in-
formation about this objective meaning.  The assumption may be
faulty in some cases, for reasons addressed at length below, but that is
a separate question from what type of original meaning dictionaries
typically provide.
Writers do not always expressly say that they are looking for the
“objective meaning” of the Constitution when they cite dictionaries
from the Founding Era, but their words and the context often reveal
that they are not looking for a subjective intention or understanding.
For example, Justice Scalia, who has recently cited period dictionaries
in constitutional cases,30 has explained that “[w]hat [he] look[s] for in
the Constitution is . . . the original meaning of the text, not what the
original draftsmen intended.”31  By the phrase “original meaning of
the text,” Justice Scalia is referring to the original objective meaning
of the Constitution rather than some subjective meaning.  Likewise, in
his separate opinion in McDonald v. City of Chicago,32 Justice Thomas
consulted dictionaries to determine what he called the “established
meaning” of the terms “privileges” and “immunities.”33  Justice
Thomas did not use the word “objective,” but he was definitely look-
ing for the objective meaning of the words rather than some subjective
meaning.
Dictionaries are certainly not the only source of the original ob-
jective meaning of the Constitution.  As an alternative to consulting
dictionaries, scholars might look at a variety of texts from the Found-
ing Era; for example, they could survey books, newspapers, and other
legal documents to discern independently how terms found in the
Constitution were typically used in the late 1700s.34  But on this point,
three caveats deserve mention.  First, consulting dictionaries is gener-
ally much easier.  Canvassing multiple sources, inferring meaning
30 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 581 (2008) (Scalia, J.) (citing 1
SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 106 (1978) (4th ed. 1773); 1
TIMOTHY CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW DICTIONARY (1771); NOAH WEBSTER,
AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1989) (1828)).
31 Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
32 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
33 Id. at 3063–64 & n.2 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring).
34 See Barnett, supra note 24, at 111–25.
366 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:358
from context, expressing the meaning accurately and concisely, and
documenting all the research would be very burdensome; it would be
like doing all the research necessary to create a dictionary definition.
Second, even if researchers look at other sources, they also should
consult Founding Era dictionaries.  Despite their flaws (discussed be-
low), dictionaries from this period remain an important historic source
that should not be ignored.  Third, dictionaries in many cases may pro-
vide reassurance that researchers have not gone astray in their own
efforts to discern the original meaning of terms in the Constitution by
looking at other texts.35
Although dictionaries are mostly cited for evidence of the origi-
nal objective meaning of words in the Constitution, dictionaries also
might provide some assistance to writers attempting to discern the
original intent of the Framers or the original understanding of the ra-
tifiers.  Dictionaries serve this role when researchers use them to look
up not the words in the Constitution but instead the words spoken or
written by the Framers and ratifiers about the Constitution.36  For ex-
ample, in The Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton wrote that
courts could strike down federal statutes if they are “contrary to the
manifest tenor of the Constitution.”37  Interpreting this passage, au-
thor Paul Taylor consulted Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary to determine
the meaning of the word “manifest” as Hamilton used it.38  “Manifest”
is not a word used in the Constitution; Taylor consulted the dictionary
to clarify the expressed understanding of one of the Framers and ra-
tifiers of the Constitution.  Using dictionaries from the Founding Era
to establish the original intent of the Framers or the original under-
standing of the ratifiers, rather than the original objective meaning of
the Constitution, is not problematic in theory.  But because the prac-
tice is potentially confusing, authors citing dictionaries for this pur-
35 One commonly discussed possible example of inferring too much about the original
meaning from the usage in historic texts involves Professor William W. Crosskey’s efforts to
discern the meaning of Congress’s power to regulate “Commerce . . . among the several States.”
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  Crosskey concluded that the term “among” might mean “within”
one state (and not between states) because he found a historic newspaper article describing how
someone died from poison “among some clam soup.”  1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLIT-
ICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1278 n.106 (1953).
36 See Eugene Kontorovich, Discretion, Delegation, and Defining in the Constitution’s Law
of Nations Clause, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1675, 1691 (2012) (“[D]ictionaries are a powerful tool for
illuminating public meaning, but . . . they are also relevant to the drafters’ intent.”).
37 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
38 Paul Taylor, Congress’s Power to Regulate the Federal Judiciary: What the First Congress
and the First Federal Courts Can Teach Today’s Congress and Courts, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 847, 920
& n.341 (2010).
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pose generally should state their assumptions39 and explain their
reasoning.
II. POTENTIAL GROUNDS FOR IMPEACHING CLAIMS ABOUT THE
ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT RELY
ON DICTIONARY DEFINITIONS
The meaning of the Constitution is often a controversial subject.
When lawyers, judges, or other authors make claims about the original
meaning, others may disagree with their conclusions.  If they have re-
lied on Founding Era dictionaries, those holding opposing views might
attempt to impeach their claims by challenging the dictionaries as
valid and reliable sources.  Below are six key potential grounds that
have been asserted for impeaching claims about the original meaning
of the Constitution that rely on dictionary definitions.  Each of these
grounds rests on real difficulties associated with attempting to use dic-
tionaries.  But none of these grounds is so strong that it should pre-
vent all reliance on dictionaries.  My advice is that authors using
dictionaries from the Founding Era to make claims about the original
meaning of the Constitution should consider carefully whether any of
these grounds for impeachment might apply and then take specific
steps, suggested below, to make their claims stronger.
A. Insufficiency
The most persistent ground for criticizing judicial opinions and
scholarly articles that rely on dictionaries from the Founding Era is
that dictionary definitions, even if they are completely accurate, are
insufficient by themselves to decide many constitutional issues.40
Even faithful originalists who are committed to ascertaining the origi-
nal objective meaning of the Constitution should acknowledge the va-
lidity of this point in many cases.  For example, a late eighteenth-
century dictionary cannot resolve the meaning of a term in the Consti-
tution if the Constitution does not use the term in accordance with its
ordinary meaning.  This situation may occur when the Constitution
redefines a term to give it a special meaning.  We now know, for in-
39 In this example, Taylor apparently assumed (1) that Hamilton’s understanding of judi-
cial review was relevant in determining the original meaning of the Constitution; (2) that in
expressing his view on the subject, Hamilton used the word “manifest” according to its objective
meaning; and (3) that the cited dictionary definition provides evidence of this objective meaning.
See id.
40 See, e.g., James L. Weis, Comment, Jurisprudence by Webster’s: The Role of the Diction-
ary in Legal Thought, 39 MERCER L. REV. 961, 963 (1988) (“Judges should admit that dictiona-
ries provide possible meanings, not dispositive resolutions.”).
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stance, that when the Constitution uses the term “state,” it is referring
to something that might be properly defined as “one of the constituent
units of a nation having a federal government.”41  But at the time of
the Founding, this specific meaning was generally unknown to lexicog-
raphers because the Constitution had not yet created our federal sys-
tem and defined the role of the states within the system.  Johnson’s A
Dictionary of the English Language defines the noun “state” to mean
“[a] republick; a government not monarchial,” without addressing the
possibility that states assembled together might form a larger nation.42
Simply citing Johnson’s definition might not properly answer a ques-
tion about the meaning of the term “state” in the Constitution.
Although the insufficiency criticism rests on valid premises, it is
largely a straw man.  I could find no clear example of any author, on
or off the bench, who has seriously asserted that it would be accept-
able to decide an important constitutional issue solely by citing a dic-
tionary.  On the contrary, writers who cite dictionaries from the
Founding Era are usually aware that dictionaries can show the objec-
tive meaning of words but do not necessarily decide legal questions.
For example, in Noel Canning v. NLRB,43 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit recently had to determine the meaning of the
word “recess” in a case challenging a recess appointment purportedly
made by the President under his authority in Article II, Section 2.44
The Court observed that the definition of “recess” in Samuel John-
son’s Dictionary—“remission and suspension of any procedure”—sug-
gested that the term recess could refer to all breaks taken by
Congress.45  The court concluded, however, that as used in the Consti-
tution, the term recess was narrower.  It said: “In context, ‘the Recess’
refers to a specific state of the legislature, so sources other than gen-
eral dictionaries are more helpful in elucidating the term’s original
public meaning.”46  The court ultimately concluded that the term “Re-
cess” was “limited to intersession recesses” and did not have the
broad definition found in Johnson’s Dictionary.47
41 State, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1151 (9th ed. 1985).
42 JOHNSON, supra note 7 (entry for “state”).
43 Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert. granted 133 S. Ct. 2861
(2013).
44 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President shall have power to fill up all Vacancies
that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at
the End of their next Session.”).
45 Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 505 (citing 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE EN-
GLISH LANGUAGE 1650 (1755)).
46 Id.
47 Id. at 506.
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In the Noel Canning case, the court declined to follow the dic-
tionary definition.  But even when judges or scholars conclude that a
term in the Constitution means what a historic dictionary defines it to
mean, they usually do not rely solely on the dictionary definition.  For
example, in United States v. Lopez,48 Justice Thomas relied on several
dictionaries from the Founding Era to determine the meaning of
“commerce” in the Commerce Clause.49  Although Justice Thomas ul-
timately concluded the Constitution used the term commerce in accor-
dance with the dictionary definitions, he did not rely solely on these
dictionaries.  He also consulted numerous other sources that con-
firmed his interpretation, including the Federalist Papers, the writings
of anti-Federalists, debates at the state ratifying conventions, and
other provisions in the Constitution.50
To avoid the “insufficiency” criticism, writers who cite a defini-
tion in a dictionary from the Founding Era as evidence of the original
meaning of the Constitution should take several actions.  They first
should recognize that although period dictionaries may provide the
objective meaning of words at the time of the Framing, these mean-
ings are not controlling if the Constitution used the words in a novel
or specialized manner.  Authors next should consider context and
other sources to determine whether this is the case, following the ex-
ample of the court in Noel Canning and of Justice Thomas in Lopez.
No simple formula exists for this step.  Writers should articulate their
reasoning and make it as strong as possible.  If analysis does not indi-
cate that the Constitution redefined the term at issue or used it in a
nonstandard way, then the dictionary definition may supply some evi-
dence upon which claims about the original meaning may rest.
B. Incompleteness
A second potential ground for impeaching claims about the origi-
nal meaning of a term in the Constitution that rely on dictionaries
from the Founding Era is that the definitions of words in these dic-
tionaries are incomplete.  They are incomplete in the sense that they
may not capture all of the different meanings that a particular word
could have had when the Constitution was written.  They may include
some of the most common meanings, but not those used in a particu-
lar constitutional provision.
48 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
49 See id. at 585–86 (Thomas, J., concurring).
50 See id. at 585–89.
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For example, in McCulloch v. Maryland,51 Chief Justice Marshall
had to determine the meaning of the word “necessary” in the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause.  Counsel for Maryland argued that the word
meant “indispensable,”52 but Chief Justice Marshall held that the word
actually meant “convenient” or “useful.”53  If Marshall was correct (as
many assume), then famous dictionaries like Johnson’s Dictionary are
apparently incomplete.  Although his Dictionary includes a definition
similar to the one that Maryland urged, it does not contain the one
settled on by Chief Justice Marshall.  Johnson’s Dictionary lists these
three meanings: “1. Needful; indispensably requisite.  2. Not free; fa-
tal; impelled by fate.  3. Conclusive; decisive by an inevitable conse-
quence.”54  The first of these definitions is like the one that Maryland
urged.  The definition that Marshall interpreted the word “necessary”
to have does not appear.
Professor Ellen Aprill has explained that definitions in older dic-
tionaries may be incomplete in their inclusion of meanings for two
important reasons.  First, older dictionaries are usually prescriptive
rather than descriptive.55  A descriptive dictionary strives to explain
how words actually are used; a prescriptive dictionary, by contrast,
seeks to inform its users about the proper way to use words.56  Samuel
Johnson’s Dictionary was explicitly a prescriptive dictionary.  Johnson
wanted to choose definitions that would preserve the purity of the
language.57  A prescriptive dictionary, accordingly, may omit usages
that the lexicographer for whatever reason considers improper.  In my
view, however, this potential difficulty seems more theoretical than
practical in efforts to discern the objective meaning of the Constitu-
tion.  The Constitution was written very carefully by authors of great
learning; it seems unlikely that their diction would differ very much
from what lexicographers of the time recommended.  We also know
from the records of the Constitutional Convention that the Framers
consulted outside sources to determine the definitions of at least some
terms in the Constitution to make sure they were using them
correctly.58
51 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
52 Id. at 413.
53 Id.
54 JOHNSON, supra note 7 (entry for “necessary”).
55 See Aprill, supra note 10, at 284.
56 See id.
57 See id.
58 John Dickenson of Delaware examined the meaning of “ex post facto” in Blackstone’s
Commentaries. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 448–49 (Max
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Second, the lexicographers writing dictionaries in the 1700s could
not and did not engage in a systematic attempt to discern all of the
meanings of words.  According to Aprill, the editors of the greatest
dictionaries of the modern era pore over texts from all genres in an
attempt to discern how words are actually used.59  They create a file
for each word giving as many different actual examples of its usage as
possible.60  During the Founding Era, when resources were fewer,
word files were less complete than they are today.  One indication of
this is that the great dictionaries of the twentieth century are much
longer than their predecessors.61  In addition, space constraints always
have limited the number of terms that could be included in any
dictionary.62
This second problem is potentially more serious.  Although the
best dictionaries of the Founding Era certainly defined all or nearly all
of the words used in the Constitution, they may not have recorded all
of the possible meanings of these words.  For example, consider Arti-
cle I, Section 9 of the Constitution, which contains the following re-
striction on taxes: “No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid,
unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before di-
rected to be taken.”63  The term “capitation” refers to a poll tax that is
uniform and equal for every taxpayer (i.e., a tax on heads).64  How-
ever, Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary defines “capitation” only as “nu-
meration by heads.”65  That definition does not fit the meaning of the
Constitution because it does not say anything about taxes.  The dic-
tionary, in other words, lists one meaning but not all of the meanings.
For these reasons, authors who cite a Founding Era dictionary to
establish the original meaning of a term in the Constitution should
recognize that the term might have a meaning that does not appear in
a dictionary.  They accordingly must be careful about drawing conclu-
Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS] (Madison’s Notes, Aug. 29, 1787) (state-
ment of John Dickenson).
59 See Aprill, supra note 10, at 286.
60 See id. at 289–90.
61 Ellen Aprill observes that Webster’s Second New International Dictionary, published in
1934, has 600,000 entries, the most of any dictionary. See id., at 295.  In contrast, Noah Webster’s
dictionary of 1828 had 70,000 entries and Samuel Johnson’s dictionary of 1755 had only 42,000
entries. See JONATHON GREEN, CHASING THE SUN: DICTIONARY MAKERS AND THE DICTIONA-
RIES THEY MADE 317 (1996); HENRY HITCHINGS, DEFINING THE WORLD: THE EXTRAORDI-
NARY STORY OF DR JOHNSON’S DICTIONARY 3 (2005).
62 See Aprill, supra note 10, at 294.
63 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
64 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 238, 1596 (9th ed. 2009).
65 JOHNSON, supra note 7 (entry for “capitation”).
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sions based just on the definitions given.  Consider this example: in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,66 a key issue
was whether the word “regulate” in the Commerce Clause could
mean “create” or “compel to exist.”67  In concluding that it could not,
the joint dissenting opinion emphasized that dictionaries from the
Founding Era did not include anything like this definition.68  That is
true, but the lack of a definition in a dictionary is not conclusive proof
that the word did not have that meaning because dictionaries often
are not complete and do not include all definitions.  The absence of a
definition indicating that “regulate” might mean “create” at most af-
fords some evidence that the word was not commonly used to mean
“create.”  The lack of a definition by itself was not dispositive and,
quite properly, the joint dissenting opinion did not treat it as such.69
Although incompleteness may be a problem in some cases, this
risk should not be exaggerated.  If the goal is to discern the original
objective meaning of the words in the Constitution—the meaning that
a reasonable person of the Founding Era would have understood the
term to have—it seems unlikely (although not impossible) that such a
meaning would not be listed in any dictionary.  If the lexicographers
did not know the meaning or did not think it important enough to
include, a hypothetical reasonable person of the Era probably would
not either.  For example, although Johnson’s Dictionary does not con-
tain a definition of “capitation” that refers to taxes,70 such a definition
does appear in John Ash’s New and Complete Dictionary of the En-
glish Language of 1775, which says that a capitation may be either a
“numeration of the people by the head” or “a poll tax.”71
In sum, no dictionary of the Founding Era was entirely complete
in defining words.  For this reason, authors should consult as many
dictionaries as reasonably possible to increase the chances of finding
66 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
67 Id. at 2586 (addressing whether “the power to ‘regulate’ something include[s] the power
to create it”); id. at 2644 (joint opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting)
(“[O]ne does not regulate commerce that does not exist by compelling its existence.”).
68 See id. at 2644 (joint opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting)
(summarizing the dictionary definitions by saying: “[Regulate] can mean to direct the manner of
something but not to direct that something come into being”).
69 See id. (noting that, in addition to the lack of a dictionary definition, “[t]here is no
instance in which this Court or Congress (or anyone else, to our knowledge) has used ‘regulate’
in that peculiar fashion”).
70 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
71 See 1 JOHN ASH, NEW AND COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(London, Edward & Charles Dilly 1775), available at http://books.google.com/books?id
=LDNAAAAAYAAJ (entry for “capitation”).
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the correct definition.  A good place to start would be the numerous
dictionaries listed in the Appendix because they are easily available
online.  Authors also should not give excessive weight to the absence
of a meaning listed in a dictionary.  The absence provides some evi-
dence that the word at issue did not commonly have the missing
meaning, but the lack of a particular definition cannot by itself prove
anything.
C. Inapplicability
A claim about the original meaning of a term that relies on a
dictionary definition also may be impeached on the ground that the
cited definition is inapplicable.  A dictionary definition may be inap-
plicable to a particular term in the Constitution for several reasons.
First, the definition might come from the wrong kind of dictionary.  A
definition from an English language dictionary may be inapplicable to
a constitutional term that has a specialized legal meaning, and, vice
versa, a definition from a legal dictionary may be inapplicable to a
constitutional term used in a non-specialized way.72  Second, even if
the proper kind of dictionary is consulted, if the dictionary contains
multiple definitions for the same word, some of these meanings
ascribed to the word may not apply to the word as it is used in the
particular context of the Constitution.  Third, dictionary definitions do
not always capture the correct meaning of words that form a part of a
phrase or compound, such as “Vice President” or “declare war.”
These problems present theoretical issues which have no simple
solution.  In actual practice, however, the problems can usually be ad-
dressed or avoided—people are generally able to use contextual cues
to eliminate most inapplicable definitions, whether using historic or
modern dictionaries.  Consider first the issue of English language dic-
tionaries versus legal dictionaries, both of which existed in the Found-
ing Era and are described in the Appendix.  Sometimes words and
phrases have a specialized legal meaning not found in ordinary dic-
tionaries.  Article III, Section 3 prohibits “Corruption of Blood” as a
punishment for treason.73  Johnson’s Dictionary defines “corruption”
as follows: “1. The principles by which bodies tend to the separation of
their parts.  2. Wickedness; perversion of principles.  3. Putrescence.
4. Matter or pus in a fore.  5. The means by which anything is vitiated;
depravation.”74  Although all of these definitions may be accurate—
72 See infra notes 74–80 and accompanying text.
73 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
74 JOHNSON, supra note 7 (entry for “corruption”).
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correct possible meanings of the term in ordinary English—none of
them is the applicable definition for the word “corruption” in Article
III.  To find the applicable definition, it is necessary to look in a legal
dictionary.  For instance, in their New Law Dictionary from 1792,
Richard and John Burn define the “corruption of blood” as a penalty
occurring when:
[A] person is attainted of treason or felony, in which case his
blood is so far stained or corrupted, that the party loses all
the nobility or gentility he might have had before, and be-
comes ignoble, and he can neither inherit lands as heir to an
ancestor, nor have an heir . . . .75
This is the meaning applicable to the term in the Constitution.
How does someone interpreting the Constitution know whether
to look in an English language dictionary or specialized legal diction-
ary?  One approach is to look first to see if the term at issue is defined
in a legal dictionary.  If the term does not appear in the legal diction-
ary, then the term likely was used in the ordinary sense.  The joint
dissenting opinion took this approach in Sebelius when, as described
above, the authors were searching for the original public meaning of
the verb “regulate.”76  The dissenters noted: “The most authoritative
legal dictionaries of the founding era lack any definition for ‘regulate’
or ‘regulation,’ suggesting that the term bears its ordinary meaning
(rather than some specialized legal meaning) in the constitutional
text.”77
This approach is not foolproof.  Just because a word may have a
specialized legal meaning does not necessarily indicate that the spe-
cialized legal meaning was used in the Constitution.  For example, Ar-
ticle II, Section 3 says that the President “shall from time to time give
to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recom-
mend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge neces-
sary and expedient.”78  The word “consideration,” as all lawyers know,
has a specialized legal meaning in some contexts.  In the 1790s, as to-
day, “[c]onsideration in contracts” was “something given in exchange,
something that is mutual and reciprocal.”79  In Article II, however, the
word “consideration” is used according to its ordinary meaning—“the
75 1 RICHARD BURN & JOHN BURN, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY: INTENDED FOR GENERAL
USE, AS WELL AS FOR GENTLEMEN OF THE PROFESSION 230 (London, A. Strathan & W. Wood-
fall 1792), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=LoxRAAAAYAAJ.
76 See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text.
77 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2644 n.1 (2012).
78 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (emphasis added).
79 1 R. BURN & J. BURN, supra note 75, at 202.
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act of considering; regard; notice”80—and not its legal meaning.  Ac-
cordingly, the only safe approach is to consider both English language
and legal dictionaries from the Founding Era when determining the
meaning of a word.
Discussion of this difficulty leads immediately to the question of
how to determine which of multiple possible definitions is applicable
to a particular word in the Constitution.  In some cases, this is easy
because the inapplicable meanings would be absurd.  For example,
Article I, Section 9, Clause 6, contains this prohibition: “[N]or shall
Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay
Duties in another.”81  Johnson’s Dictionary indicates that the word
“oblige” can mean either “to compel to something” or “to please.”82
Here it is easy to surmise which of the two definitions is applicable.
The Constitution must be saying that no vessel shall “be compelled”
to pay duties because obviously none but the most civic-minded would
“be pleased” to pay duties.
In other cases, deciding which one of multiple definitions is appli-
cable can be more challenging.  There is no simple rule like choosing
the first definition because it is the most common; different editors
had their own views on how to list and order definitions.  An example
of this difficulty appears in Crawford v. Washington.83  In that case,
the Supreme Court was required to interpret the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause, which says: “In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him.”84  The question was whether the Confrontation Clause
was violated when a tape-recorded statement to the police was played
before the jury.85  To decide this question, the Court had to consider
whether the person who made the statement on the recording was a
“witness.”86  Justice Scalia wrote the following: “[The Confrontation
Clause] applies to ‘witnesses’ against the accused—in other words,
those who ‘bear testimony.’”87  Justice Scalia then focused the rest of
his opinion on what constitutes “testimony.”88  In this instance, Justice
80 JOHNSON, supra note 7 (definition of “consideration”).
81 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 6 (emphasis added).
82 JOHNSON, supra note 7 (definition of “oblige”).
83 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
84 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38.
85 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38.
86 See id. at 51.
87 Id. (quoting 2 WEBSTER, supra note 30).
88 See id. at 51–69.
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Scalia chose one of many meanings listed by Webster in his definition
of “witness.”  These definitions included the following:
WIT’NESS, n. [Sax. witnesse] 1. Testimony; attestation of a
fact or event.  2. That which furnishes evidence or proof.
3. A person who knows or sees any thing; one personally pre-
sent.  4. One who sees the execution of an instrument, and
subscribes it for the purpose of confirming its authenticity by
his testimony.  5. One who gives testimony.
* * *
WIT’NESS, v.i. 1. To bear testimony.  2. To give evidence.89
In Crawford, Justice Scalia based his definition of the noun “wit-
ness” in the Confrontation Clause on the first meaning given for “wit-
ness” when it is used as an intransitive verb.  Justice Scalia did not
explain why he did not select one of the five meanings listed for “wit-
ness” when used as a noun.90  In addition, Justice Scalia’s opinion does
not recognize that the term “witness” does not necessarily have any-
thing to do with “testimony.”91  For example, the third noun definition
indicates that “witness” can include a person “who knows or sees any
thing” without necessarily testifying about it.92  That meaning would
give very different content to the Confrontation Clause.  Justice Scalia
may have selected the correct meaning of “witness” in Crawford, but
the dictionary citation itself does not make the correctness of the se-
lection apparent.
The issue of selecting the correct meaning does not arise often,
but it should not be ignored.  No perfect method exists for determin-
ing which of multiple dictionary definitions provides the applicable
meaning of a term in the Constitution.  In almost all cases, guidance
from outside the dictionary may be necessary to confirm a selection.
It might be that particular definitions would not make sense in the
particular context, or that other extrinsic sources may give more
weight to one particular meaning than to other meanings.  But a dic-
tionary itself cannot reveal which of multiple meanings is the correct
meaning.  This is an inherent limitation on all dictionaries.  The best
advice is that authors should consider all of the possible meanings
listed in a dictionary and state expressly the reasons that they are
choosing one meaning over others.
89 2 WEBSTER, supra note 30 (entries for “witness”).
90 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (citing 2 WEBSTER, supra note 30).
91 See id.
92 See 2 WEBSTER, supra note 30 (entries for “witness”).
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D. Inconsistency
Another potential problem with the use of dictionaries is that
judges and scholars do not always use them consistently when they are
attempting to discern the meaning of words in the Constitution.93  For
example, a court might rely on various dictionaries in one case and
others in another case.  The judicial opinions in Sebelius cited seven
different historic dictionaries,94 while the opinion in Williams v. Illi-
nois,95 decided just one week earlier, quoted only one of these diction-
aries.96  The Supreme Court apparently has not established any
standard for deciding when to look at dictionaries or which dictiona-
ries to consult.  This problem has an analogue in the field of statutory
interpretation, where selective and inconsistent citation of legislative
history documents has been criticized.  Justice Scalia has said: “Judge
Harold Leventhal used to describe the use of legislative history as the
equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the
heads of the guests for one’s friends.”97  In other words, judges look
for what supports their position and overlook contrary evidence.  If
this characterization applies equally to reliance on dictionaries from
the Founding Era, it would certainly lessen the credibility of opinions
that rest on them.
Although this kind of inconsistency is a problem, the solution is
not necessarily to give up citing dictionaries from the Founding Era or
to dismiss all citations by others.  Indeed, ignoring evidence from dic-
tionaries seems just as bad as selectively citing this evidence.  Instead,
striving for more consistency may ameliorate the problem.  The idea
that historical accounts might be tainted by selectivity in looking at
sources is nothing new, but we still have respected historians.  To
make their use of dictionaries from the Founding Era more convinc-
ing, judges, litigants, and scholars should follow a few simple rules.  If
they look up dictionary definitions for one disputed word, they should
93 Professor Aprill asserts, based on a study of federal cases, that judges are “selective and
inconsistent in when and how they use dictionary definitions.”  Aprill, supra note 10, at 281.
94 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2644 & n.1 (2012) (joint opinion
of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (citing 2 ASH, supra note 71; R. BURN &
J. BURN, supra note 75, at 281; 2 TIMOTHY CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW DIC-
TIONARY (2d ed. 1771); THOMAS DYCHE & WILLIAM PARDON, A NEW GENERAL ENGLISH DIC-
TIONARY (London, C. Bathurst et al., 16th ed. 1777); GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY
(London, W. Strahan & W. Woodfall, 10th ed. 1782); 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, J. F. & C. Rivington et al., 7th ed. 1785); 2 WEBSTER, supra
note 30).
95 Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).
96 Id. at 2259 (quoting 2 WEBSTER, supra note 30).
97 Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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look up the definitions for all disputed words.  When looking up
words, they should check all the relevant dictionaries from the Found-
ing Era.  Although this was once difficult, with the internet it has be-
come much easier.  After looking up the words, they should consider
all of the relevant definitions in these dictionaries.  Finally, they
should explain the choices that they make, such as why they rely on
certain definitions and not others.
E. Imprecision
Even if dictionary definitions are not incorrect or inappropriate,
sometimes they are imprecise.  Imprecision may hinder the use of dic-
tionaries by courts because judges often are asked to decide border-
line cases.  Imprecision exists because lexicographers must choose
broad definitions that cover several possible meanings rather than
providing the definition of every specific meaning.98  They also some-
times must trade specificity for understandability.  Some dictionaries,
like the Oxford English Dictionary, have sought to make its defini-
tions most accessible to generalists; other dictionaries, like Merriam-
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, reportedly have sought
precision even though its definitions may not be readily understanda-
ble by casual readers.99
In Bilski v. Kappos,100 the Supreme Court held that, under the
Patents Act, a patent could not be issued for the invention of a
method of hedging risk in the field of commodities trading in the en-
ergy market.  Justice Stevens wrote a concurrence in the judgment in
which he addressed the question of whether issuing the patent would
exceed what is permitted under the Constitution’s Patents Clause.101
The Patents Clause empowers Congress “To promote the Progress
of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the
exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.”102  Consulting a period dic-
tionary, Justice Stevens wrote:
It appears, however, that regardless of how one construes the
term “useful arts,” business methods are not included . . . .
Noah Webster’s first American dictionary defined the term
“art” as the “disposition or modification of things by human
skill, to answer the purpose intended,” and differentiated be-
98 See Aprill, supra note 10, at 293.
99 Id. at 293–94.
100 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
101 Id. at 3236 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
102 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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tween “useful or mechanic” arts, on the one hand, and “lib-
eral or polite” arts, on the other.103
Following this quotation, Justice Stevens concluded that the in-
vention of a business method cannot promote the “useful arts” be-
cause the definition of “arts” refers to the disposition of “things” and
a business method by itself does not create useful things.104  In his
opinion, Justice Stevens may have reached the correct interpretation
of the Patents Clause, but it is open to question whether the word
“thing” in the dictionary definition is sufficiently precise to justify his
conclusion.
Part of the solution to the problem of imprecision, like most of
the other possible problems identified above, is to consider definitions
from multiple dictionaries and to look for confirmation from other
extrinsic sources.  In some cases, though, definitions may be insuffi-
ciently detailed to supply valid and reliable answers about the original
meaning of particular terms in the Constitution.
F. Incorrectness
Finally, reliance on a particular definition in a Founding Era dic-
tionary may be impeached on grounds that the definition is incor-
rect—that is to say, the definition does not reflect the ordinary
meaning of the word at the time.  Incorrectness in dictionary defini-
tions has three principal causes.
First, mistakes happen.  Creating a dictionary is difficult work
that requires detailed knowledge about a great many things.  The lexi-
cographer has very limited time to spend on any individual word, and
it is easy to make a mistake, especially with difficult words.105  For
example, Samuel Johnson famously erred in defining the word “pas-
tern” to be “the knee of a horse.”106  The word in fact refers to a lower
part of a horse’s leg.107  Johnson’s famous biographer, James Boswell,
records: “A lady once asked [Dr. Johnson] how he came to define
Pastern the knee of a horse: instead of making an elaborate defence,
103 See Bilski, 130 S Ct. at 3243 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting 1 WEB-
STER, supra note 30 (emphasis added)).
104 Id. at 3244–45.
105 See Aprill, supra note 10, at 293.
106 See JOHNSON, supra note 7 (definition of “pastern”).
107 Pastern, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 41, at 861
(defining “pastern” as “a part of the foot of an equine extending from the fetlock to the top of
the hoof”).
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as she expected, he at once answered, ‘Ignorance, Madam, pure
ignorance.’”108
Second, Founding Era dictionaries may contain definitions that
were already obsolete by the late 1780s.  Johnson identified many ob-
solete words from the folio edition of his Dictionary when he prepared
it in an octavo.109  Only some of the words that were eliminated had
previously been identified as being obsolete.110  For example, the 1755
folio edition contained an obsolete definition of the preposition “un-
til,” a word that appears eight times in the Constitution.111  Johnson
took the meaning “unto” out of his octavo edition definition of “un-
til,” but that definition appears in other dictionaries.112  This problem,
however, should not be exaggerated.  Words often retain their mean-
ings for hundreds of years.  The Supreme Court, for instance, con-
cluded in District of Columbia v. Heller,113 that the “18th-century
meaning” of “arms” in the Second Amendment “is no different from
the meaning today.”114
Third, legal dictionaries tend to rely on court opinions, but court
opinions themselves often rely on other sources to define the words.115
Sometimes precision can be lost in transmitting the meanings from
one source to another.
There is no definitive list of erroneous or inaccurate definitions
from dictionaries from the Founding Era, and judges and legal schol-
ars are ill-equipped to identify errors on their own.  After all, they
consult dictionaries from the Founding Era precisely because they do
not know for sure the historical meaning of a term.  Yet, the problem
can be addressed.  Looking at multiple dictionaries may help reduce
the likelihood of being misled by an erroneous definition.  In addition,
looking at other sources, especially the sources upon which dictiona-
ries rely, may help to eliminate errors.  For example, once a definition
is selected, it could be checked to see whether it makes sense when
applied to words used in other documents.  What judges should not do
108 1 JAMES BOSWELL, LIFE OF JOHNSON 340 (New York, Harper & Brothers, George
Birkbeck Hill ed., 1891).
109 Isamu Hayakawa, Obsolete Words and Meanings in Johnson’s Dictionary, 18 LANG. &
CULTURE BULL. . 1, 3–4 (2008) (Japan), available at http://leo.aichi-u.ac.jp/~goken/bulletin/pdfs/
NO18/01HayakawaIpdf.
110 Id.
111 See id. at 4.
112 Compare JOHNSON, supra note 7 (defining “until” in its preposition form to mean “to”),
with 2 ASH, supra note 94 (defining “untill” to mean both “to” and “unto”).
113 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
114 Id. at 581.
115 See Aprill, supra 10, at 310.
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is accept unquestioningly any definition from a dictionary without ex-
erting efforts to ascertain whether the definition was accurate at the
time it was included in the dictionary.
CONCLUSION
Judges, practicing attorneys, and legal scholars often cite diction-
aries from the Founding Era as evidence of the original meaning of
the Constitution.  This practice is likely to grow because it has become
very easy to view these dictionaries for free on the internet.  Yet, cit-
ing dictionaries is controversial.  Few jurists, lawyers, professors, or
law students have received much training or guidance on dictionaries
that are more than 200 years old.  In addition, claims made about the
original meaning of the Constitution that rest in whole or in part on
dictionary definitions are subject to impeachment on a number of dif-
ferent grounds.116
This Article has sought to address this situation.  It argues neither
for nor against using dictionaries to make claims about the original
meaning of the Constitution.  Instead, it seeks to describe and con-
sider, in a critical manner, the theories behind citing Founding Era
dictionaries as a source of the original meaning.  It further considers
six important possible grounds for impeaching claims about the origi-
nal meaning of the Constitution that rely on Founding Era dictiona-
ries.  My advice is that anyone relying on Founding Era dictionaries or
evaluating the reliance on them by others should take into account the
considerations on both sides.
Looking at period dictionaries does not prevent anyone from
looking at other sources to discern the original meaning of the Consti-
tution.  Writers attempting to discern the original meaning of the Con-
stitution should consult numerous different kinds of texts.
Dictionaries from the Founding Era are just one type of text (although
not the only one) that researchers might consider in attempting to dis-
cern the original meaning.  A dictionary can supply additional infor-
mation.  A definition may not be controlling, but a large discrepancy
between what the dictionary says and the claimed meaning for a word
may be seen as flashing cautionary yellow lights.  Likewise, a diction-
ary that provides a meaning consistent with a claimed definition may
reduce doubts about whether the meaning is plausible.
116 See supra Part II.
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APPENDIX: COMMONLY AVAILABLE AND REGULARLY CITED
ENGLISH LANGUAGE AND LEGAL DICTIONARIES FROM
THE FOUNDING ERA
This Appendix describes nine English language dictionaries and
four legal dictionaries from the Founding Era.  The dictionaries are
listed in alphabetical order by the last name of the author.  I have
selected these dictionaries for inclusion here for two reasons.  First,
they are the dictionaries cited in Supreme Court opinions.117  Second,
the full text of each of these dictionaries is available online, for free,
from Google Books.118  The internet Universal Resource Locators
(URLs) for the dictionaries are included in the footnotes below.
Please note that these dictionaries are best viewed using the Google
Chrome browser.  Other dictionaries from the same period, which are
not described here, may also contain useful information.  As ex-
plained above, in general, the more dictionaries consulted, the more
persuasive and reliable is the evidence found.
English Language Dictionaries from the Founding Era
1. JOHN ASH, NEW AND COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1775)119
The Reverend John Ash, a Baptist minister educated at Bristol
Baptist College, lived in England from about 1724 until 1779.120  Al-
though he later received an honorary LL.D. from a university in Scot-
land, he was not trained as a lexicographer.121  His two-volume
dictionary relied heavily on earlier dictionaries by Nathan Bailey and
Samuel Johnson (both of which are discussed below).122  Ash’s dic-
tionary contains two features that distinguish it from competing
works, but neither of these features contributes much to the interpre-
tation of the Constitution.  First, the dictionary contains many special-
ized, obsolete, provincial, and vulgar words not found in other
117 See, e.g., supra notes 1–5.
118 GOOGLE BOOKS, http://books.google.com (last visited Feb. 13, 2014).
119 JOHN ASH, NEW AND COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London,
Edward & Charles Dilly 1775), available at http://books.google.com/books?id
=LDNAAAAAYAAJ (vol. 1), and http://books.google.com/books?id=WTFAAAAAYAAJ (vol.
2).
120 See 3 THE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE SOCIETY FOR THE DIFFUSION OF USE-
FUL KNOWLEDGE 761 (London, Longman, Brown, Green & Longmans 1844); G.H. Taylor, The
Reverend John Ash, LL.D., 1724–1779, 20 BAPTIST Q. 4, 4 (1963).
121 Taylor, supra note 120, at 4, 11.
122 Id. at 12.
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sources.123  Ash writes in the “advertisement” at the beginning of his
dictionary:
The plan of this Work is extensive beyond any thing that has
yet been attempted of the kind in the English Language.  It
was intended to introduce not only all the . . . common
words . . . but all proper names of men and women, heathen
gods and goddesses, heroes, princes, poets, historians, wise
men and philosophers of special note, whether ancient or
modern . . . .124
Second, this dictionary was also one of the first to include marks
for stressed syllables.125  Justices of the Supreme Court have cited this
dictionary in a few cases without commenting on perceived strengths
or weaknesses of it as a source of the original meaning of the
Constitution.126
2. NATHAN BAILEY, THE NEW UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1756)127
This dictionary was first published in 1721 and may have been the
bestselling dictionary of the eighteenth century.128  The author of the
first three editions was Nathan Bailey, an English schoolmaster who
became a professional lexicographer.129  Bailey’s efforts were joined in
1755, and later taken over entirely, by Joseph Nicol Scott, a clergyman
and physician, who extensively revised the dictionary and ultimately
compiled twenty-seven additional editions.130  Sidney I. Landau, an
editor of the Cambridge University Press, has praised Bailey for his
efforts to include common words and to define words as they were
actually used.131  Samuel Johnson apparently relied on Bailey’s defini-
tions when he prepared his dictionary;132 in turn, Scott relied on and
perhaps plagiarized Johnson’s dictionary in preparing subsequent edi-
123 Id.
124 1 ASH, supra note 119, at A2.
125 Taylor, supra note 120, at 12.
126 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2644 (2012) (joint opinion of
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495, 537 (1952).
127 NATHAN BAILEY, THE NEW UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY
(London, T. Waller, 4th ed. 1756), available at http://books.google.com/books/?id=HXQS
AAAAIAAJ.
128 See SIDNEY I. LANDAU, DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY 44, 46
(1984) (estimating that Bailey’s dictionary was more popular than Samuel Johnson’s).
129 See id. at 44.
130 See GREEN, supra note 61, at 234–36.
131 See LANDAU, supra note 128, at 47.
132 See id.
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tions.133  The work is not very useful for looking up specialized legal
terms in the Constitution; for example, it does not contain definitions
for words like “impeachment” or “misdemeanor.”134  Members of the
Supreme Court have cited the dictionary in several opinions, appar-
ently preferring the 26th edition published in 1789.135
3. BARCLAY’S UNIVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1792)136
This dictionary was first published in 1774.137  The Reverend
James Barclay, the original editor, was a clergyman in Edmonton, En-
gland and a schoolmaster.138  He did not claim comprehensiveness in
definitions but expressed hope that his book would serve a didactic
purpose.139  Aimed at least in part for use in schools, the book con-
tains several introductory essays on grammar, spelling, history, and
other subjects.  Perhaps most interesting to modern lawyers are the
pages describing the British Courts of Justice as they existed at the
time of publication.140  Barclay also claimed to be one of the first lexi-
cographers to identify synonyms.141  Some entries contain substantive
expositions more suitable for an encyclopedia than a dictionary; for
example, the entry for “Richard I” is a biographical summary that
runs nearly seven columns.142  Justice Thomas has cited this
dictionary.143
133 See GREEN, supra note 61, at 235.
134 See BAILEY, supra note 127 (defining “impeachable” and “misdemean” in non-legal
senses but not defining impeachment or misdemeanor); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (using
the terms “impeachment” and “misdemeanors”).
135 See, e.g., Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 475 (2002) (citing the twenty-sixth edition pub-
lished in 1789); id. at 492 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same); INS v.
St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 337 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same); Camps Newfound/Owatonna,
Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 637 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same); United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 586 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
136 JAMES BARCLAY, COMPLETE AND UNIVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (London, J.F. &
C. Rivington et al. 1792) [hereinafter BARCLAY’S], available at http://books.google.com/books/
?id=yeUIAAAAQAAJ.
137 M.K.C. MacMahon, Barclay, James, in 3 OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRA-
PHY 768–69 (H.C.G. Matthew & Brian Harrison eds. 2004).
138 See NICHOLAS HANS, NEW TRENDS IN EDUCATION IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 112
(Cox & Wyman Ltd., 2d ed. 1966).
139 See BARCLAY’S, supra note 136, at A4 (expressing the hope that the dictionary will
allow that the “Master may advance one step farther with his pupils.”).
140 See id. at xliv–xlvii.
141 See id. at A3.
142 See id. (entry for “Richard I”).
143 See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 637–38 n.20
(1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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4. THOMAS DYCHE & WILLIAM PARDON, A NEW GENERAL
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (18th ed. 1781)144
Eighteen editions of this dictionary were printed between 1735
and 1781.145  The dictionary was begun by Reverend Thomas Dyche,
an English minister and school teacher, and completed a few years
after Dyche’s death by William Pardon.146  The dictionary describes
Pardon as a “Gent.,”147 but further information is unknown.148  Later
editions were revised by unknown authors.149  The dictionary pro-
claims that it is “[p]eculiarly calculated for the USE and IMPROVE-
MENT Of such as are unacquainted with the LEARNED
LANGUAGES.”150  Aimed at less scholarly readers,151 the dictionary
does not contain etymologies.152  The original version of the dictionary
had wordy definitions, almost encyclopedic in nature, but these defini-
tions were tightened up in later editions.153  The dictionary does not
appear to have many specialized legal terms; for example, it has an
entry for the word “legislator” but not “legislation.”154  Members of
the Supreme Court have cited this dictionary in a few cases.155
5. SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (10th ed. 1792)156
This dictionary is the most famous and most cited of all the lexi-
cographic works of the seventeenth century.  Samuel Johnson under-
144 THOMAS DYCHE & WILLIAM PARDON, A NEW GENERAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY
(London, Toplis & Bunney, 18th ed. 1781), available at http://books.google.com/books?id
=xOcIAAAAQAAJ.
145 See id. cover page; DeWitt T. Starnes & Gertrude E. Noyes, Thomas Dyche and William
Pardon’s A New General English Dictionary (1735), in 2 LEXICOGRAPHY: CRITICAL CONCEPTS
15 (R.R.K. Hartman ed., 2003).
146 See DYCHE & PARDON, supra note 144, cover page; Starnes & Noyes, supra note 145, at
15.
147 See DYCHE & PARDON, supra note 144, cover page.
148 See Starnes & Noyes, supra note 145, at 16.
149 See id. at 24.
150 DYCHE & PARDON, supra note 144, cover page.
151 See GREEN, supra note 61, at 238.
152 See Starnes & Noyes, supra note 145, at 17.
153 See id. at 24.
154 See DYCHE & PARDON, supra note 144 (entry for “legislator”); see also U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 17 (using the term “legislation”).
155 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2644 (2012) (joint opin-
ion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (citing the 16th edition published in
1777); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 538 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(same).
156 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, J.F. & C.
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took its compilation in 1746 when he was thirty-eight.157  At the time,
he was a failed school teacher and an impecunious freelance writer for
magazines, specializing in news about Parliament.158  He was thinking
about going into law, but undertook the work of writing a dictionary
after a group of booksellers offered him 1500 guineas for the project, a
sum he needed to keep debt collectors at bay.159  He had no training as
a lexicographer,160 but completed what turned out to be one of the
greatest works of the English language.  The original edition contains
42,000 headwords, the definitions of which Johnson prepared him-
self.161  He documented the entries with 116,000 quotations,162 many
taken from Bacon, Milton, Pope, Shakespeare, Spenser, and other no-
table English literary figures.163  His definitions are extremely well-
written and reveal much about his personality.164  Johnson included
both legal terms, which he distinguished from ordinary English terms
with the designation “[in law.].”  A good example is his entry for “eq-
uity”: “E’QUITY. s. [equite´, French.] 1. Justice; right; honesty. Tillot-
son.  2. Impartiality. Hooker.  3. [In law.]  The rules of decision
observed by the Court of Chancery.”165  Members of the Supreme
Court appear to have cited this dictionary more often than any other
dictionary from the Founding Era.  Their opinions rely on various edi-
tions without indicating why some might be preferable to others.166
6. WILLIAM PERRY, THE ROYAL STANDARD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY (1788)167
This dictionary is notable because it was the first dictionary pub-
lished in the United States.168  It was initially prepared by William
Rivington et al., 10th ed. 1792), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=j-
UIAAAAQAAJ.
157 See GREEN, supra note 61, at 263.
158 See id.
159 See id. at 262–64.
160 See id. at 262.
161 See HITCHINGS, supra note 61, at 3.
162 See GREEN, supra note 61, at 266.
163 See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 7 (entries from “gangrene” to “garnish,” citing all of
these authors and others on a single page).
164 See GREEN, supra note 61, at 267.
165 JOHNSON, supra note 7 (entry for “equity”).
166 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 428 n.55 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (citing the 4th edition published in 1773); Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654, 719 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing the 6th edition published in 1785).
167 WILLIAM PERRY, THE ROYAL STANDARD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Worcester, 1st Am.
ed. 1788), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=OpkRAAAAIAAJ.
168 See GREEN, supra note 61 at 287.
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Perry, a Scottish school teacher who was dissatisfied with the pronun-
ciation prescribed in other dictionaries.169  The American Edition was
printed in Massachusetts and was dedicated to the American Acad-
emy of Arts and Sciences.170  According to the title page, the diction-
ary was “intended to fix a standard for the pronunciation of the
English language, conformably to the present practice of polite speak-
ers in Great Britain and the United States.”171  The dictionary was es-
pecially popular in America, and is said to have influenced New
England pronunciation.172  The definitions in general appear to be
shorter than those in other dictionaries of the same period.  Justice
Thomas has cited this dictionary in one case.173
7. THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (3d ed. 1790) (2 volumes)174
Thomas Sheridan, an actor and stage manager, published the first
edition of this dictionary in 1780.175  An expert on elocution, he sought
to revise spelling and include an accurate guide to pronunciation.176
Previous dictionaries attempted to show how to pronounce words by
adding accent marks and diacritics to the headword of each entry.177
Sheridan invented the modern style of dictionaries of spelling head-
words in an ordinary manner and then following them with a phonetic
spelling,178 which Sheridan explained in considerable depth at the start
of the first volume of his dictionary.179  For example, the entry for
Monday in William Perry’s pronouncing dictionary begins with
“Mo´n′da¯y,”180 while the corresponding entry in Sheridan’s dictionary
169 See Massimo Sturiale, Prescriptivism and 18th-Century Bilingual Dictionaries: William
Perry’s The Standard French and English Pronouncing Dictionary (1795), in PERSPECTIVES ON
PRESCRIPTIVISM 181, 183–84 (Joan C. Beal et al. eds., 2008).
170 See PERRY, supra note 167, title page.
171 See id.
172 See Sturiale, supra note 169, at 183.
173 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3063 n.2 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (citing PERRY, supra note 167).
174 THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London,
Charles Dilly, 3d ed. 1790), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=pBFJAAAAcAAJ
(vol. 1), and http://books.google.com/books?id=pJoRAAAAIAAJ (vol. 2).
175 Thomas Sheridan, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/
topic/540058/Thomas-Sheridan (last visited Jan. 17, 2014).
176 See id.; see also 1 SHERIDAN, supra note 174, title page (“Calculated solely for the Pur-
poses of teaching Propriety of Pronunciation, and Justness of Delivery, in that Tongue, by the
Organs of Speech.”).
177 See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 156.
178 See LANDAU, supra note 128, at 57.
179 See 1 SHERIDAN, supra note 174, at i–liv.
180 PERRY, supra note 167 (entry for “Monday”).
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begins with “MONDAY, mu´n′- da´.”181  Sheridan and Samuel Johnson
had been friends, but became rivals when Sheridan produced his own
dictionary.  They soon traded insults: “Johnson, said Sheridan, had ‘gi-
gantic fame—in these days of little men.’  ‘Sherry,’ remarked the doc-
tor [i.e., Johnson], ‘is dull, naturally dull, but it must have taken him a
great deal of pains to become what we now see him.  Such an excess of
stupidity is not in nature.’”182  The Supreme Court has cited the sixth
edition of this dictionary.183
8. JOHN WALKER, A CRITICAL PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY
(1791)184
John Walker was an English actor and teacher and a friend of
Samuel Johnson and Edmund Burke.185  He produced both a rhyming
dictionary and this pronouncing dictionary.186  His definitions of the
meaning of words do not appear to be particularly special; the hall-
mark of the dictionary is its improvements of Sheridan’s work on pro-
nunciation.  Walker praised Thomas Sheridan for dividing words into
syllables and showing how vowels were pronounced.187  But Walker’s
method of indicating how to say words and the accuracy of the indi-
vidual descriptions is considered superior.188  It is not clear that eight-
eenth-century pronunciation affects constitutional interpretation, but
Sidney Landau believes that Walker’s recommendations with respect
to pronunciation continue to affect the legal profession.  He writes:
I have been struck by the unusual and emphatic pronuncia-
tion of the second syllable of juror when uttered by lawyers
or judges . . . . The same measured kind of . . . pronunciation
[is] heard for the last syllable of defendant . . . . I wonder
whether they are not uttered, by way of many intermediaries,
181 2 SHERIDAN, supra note 174 (entry for “Monday”).  Sheridan explains that “u´ is pro-
nounced like the “u” in “bush” and that “a´ is pronounced like the “a” in “hate.” See 1 SHERI-
DAN, supra note 174, at ii.
182 GREEN, supra note 61, at 288.
183 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584 (2008) (citing the 6th edition
published in 1796); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199 (2003) (same).
184 JOHN WALKER, A CRITICAL PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY (London, G.G.J. & J.
Robinson, & T. Cadell, 1791), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=DaURAA
AAIAAJ.
185 See John Walker, 28 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 272 (11th ed. 1911).
186 See id.
187 WALKER, supra note 184, preface.
188 TETSURO HAYASHI, THE THEORY OF ENGLISH LEXICOGRAPHY 1530–1791, at 127–28
(1978).
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in obedience to Walker’s admonitions in 1791 against the
“slurring” of unaccented syllables.189
The Supreme Court has cited Walker’s dictionary in several cases.190
9. NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)191
Noah Webster was born in Connecticut in 1758.192  He graduated
from Yale, having studied Latin, Greek, and Hebrew.193  Although he
had hoped to become an attorney, he found employment instead as a
school teacher.194  He gained early fame by producing The American
Spelling Book, a textbook used in schools that reformed traditional
British orthography.195  It remained in print for a century and its total
sales topped 80 million copies.196  Webster completed his first, mod-
estly sized dictionary, A Compendious Dictionary of the English Lan-
guage, in 1806.197  He then turned to his greatest work, An American
Dictionary of the English Language, which he completed in 1828.198
His goals were to standardize American English usage and to simplify
spelling.199  The dictionary was far larger than competing works, in-
cluding over 70,000 words.200  The initial edition was not a financial
success,201 but in time, the quality of the work became appreciated.
The Supreme Court cites this dictionary often as evidence of the origi-
nal meaning of the Constitution.202  The Court’s unstated justification
189 LANDAU, supra note 128, at 58–59.
190 See, e.g., Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 614 n.7 (1993); Helling v. McKinney, 509
U.S. 25, 38 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 529 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
191 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New York,
S. Converse 1828), available at https://archive.org/stream/americandictiona01websrich#page/n7/
mode/2up.  An abridged version of the original 1828 edition was published in 1830 and is
available on Google Books. NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (New York, S. Converse, 3d ed. 1830), available at http://books.google.com/books/
?id=9ZUVAAAAYAAJ.
192 See GREEN, supra note 61, at 308.
193 See id. at 307–08.
194 See id. at 308.
195 See LANDAU, supra note 128, at 59.
196 See GREEN, supra note 61, at 309.
197 See id. at 312.
198 See id. at 318.
199 See id.
200 See id. at 317.
201 See LANDAU, supra note 128, at 61.
202 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2644 (2012) (joint opin-
ion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).  The search term “webster /5 diction-
ary /5 1828” yields twenty-seven cases in Westlaw’s SCT database.
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is perhaps that the dictionary may reflect better the ways in which
Americans used and understood the words in the Constitution.  For
example, the dictionary contains these definitions of “congress” that
are special to America:
2. The assembly of delegates of the several British colonies in
America, which united to resist the claims of Great Britain in
1774.  3. The assembly of delegates of the several United
States, after the declaration of independence, in 1776, and
until the adoption of the present constitution.  4. The assem-
bly of senators and representatives of the several states of
North America, according to the present constitution, or po-
litical compact, by which they are united in a federal
republic.203
This justification for citing Webster’s dictionary, however, is sub-
ject to some question, given that Webster wanted to shape usage and
not just reflect it.  In addition, the dictionary was published decades
after the Founding Era, and the usage of particular words may have
changed.
Legal Dictionaries from the Founding Era
1. RICHARD BURN & JOHN BURN, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY
(1792)204
Richard Burn was born in 1709.205  He was an English clergyman
and chancellor of the diocese of Carlisle, well-known for his highly
regarded treatise on ecclesiastical law.206  This law dictionary was ed-
ited and published after Richard Burn’s death by his son, John
Burn.207  The dictionary has received negative reviews.  “The Titles are
brief,” one critic wrote, “and for the most part unsatisfactory.”208  The
alleged shortcomings, however, are not readily apparent.  For exam-
ple, the definition of “affinity” is “relation by marriage, as consan-
guinity is relation by blood,”209 which is very similar to short modern
203 WEBSTER, supra note 191, at 179 (1830 abridged edition) (entry for “congress”).
204 RICHARD BURN & JOHN BURN, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY (London, A. Strahan & W.
Woodfall 1792), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=LoxRAAAAYAAJ.
205 See Norma Landau, Burn, Richard, in 8 OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRA-
PHY 879 (H.C.G. Matthew & Brian Harrison eds. 2004).
206 See id.
207 JOHN D. COWLEY, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ABRIDGMENTS, DIGESTS, DICTIONARIES AND
INDEXES OF ENGLISH LAW TO THE YEAR 1800, at xci (1932) (noting that one critic questioned
whether Richard Burn had wanted the dictionary to be published).
208 J.G. MARVIN, LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, OR A THESAURUS OF AMERICAN, ENGLISH,
IRISH, AND SCOTCH LAW BOOKS 163 (Philadelphia, T. & J. W. Johnson 1847).
209 R. BURN & J. BURN, supra note 204, at 25.
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definitions of the term.  This law dictionary is occasionally cited by
members of the Supreme Court.210
2. TIMOTHY CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW
DICTIONARY (1764) (two volumes)211
Timothy Cunningham lived in London at Gray’s Inn and wrote a
large number of law books, especially on commercial law.212  His law
dictionary is like an encyclopedia or treatise, with many substantive
explanations rather than just definitions.  He competed with Giles Ja-
cob’s law dictionary (discussed below), but his book was not as suc-
cessful.213  Some of the definitions appear insufficiently detailed to
provide help interpreting the Constitution.  For example, the diction-
ary defines “ex post facto” as “a term used in the law, signifying some-
thing done after another thing that was committed before.”214  This
definition would not provide much aid in determining questions such
as whether the prohibitions on ex post facto laws215 apply to both civil
and criminal legislation.  The first edition was published in 1764 and
the third and final edition was published in 1783.216
3. GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1750)217
Giles Jacob was born in 1686.218  He was a prolific author, heavily
influenced by Locke.219  Although Alexander Pope denigrated the
quality of Jacob’s work,220 his law dictionary was very successful.  Ja-
cob asserted that two-thirds of the material in the first edition, pub-
210 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2644 n.1 (2012) (joint
opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
211 TIMOTHY CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW-DICTIONARY (London, S.
Crowder et al. 1764) (two volumes), available at http://books.google.com/books?id
=Y580AQAAMAAJ (vol. 1), and http://books.google.com/books?id=spc0AQAAMAAJ (vol.2).
212 See A.M. Clerke & J.A. Marchand, Cunningham, Timothy, in 14 OXFORD DICTIONARY
OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 699 (H.C.G. Matthew & Brian Harrison eds. 2004).
213 See id.
214 1 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 211 (entry for “ex post facto”).
215 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 10.
216 See Clerke & Marchand, supra note 212.
217 GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY (The Savoy, Henry Lintot, 6th ed. 1750),
available at http://books.google.com/books?id=zdED1S0lCoAC.
218 Gary L. McDowell, The Politics of Meaning: Law Dictionaries and the Liberal Tradition
of Interpretation, 44 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 257, 261 n.29 (2000).
219 Id. at 270–74.
220 See Matthew Kilburn, Jacob, Giles, in 29 OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRA-
PHY 546–47 (H.C.G. Matthew & Brian Harrison eds. 2004).  Pope wrote the couplet, “Jacob, the
Scourge of Grammar, mark with awe, Nor less revere him, Blunderbuss of Law.” See id.  Pope
may have seen Jacob “as a dunce because of his devotion to a culture of litigation that Pope
deplored as uncivilized.” Id.
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lished in 1729, was entirely new.221  The printing, spelling, and diction,
however, are very old-fashioned, making the dictionary both quaint
and somewhat difficult to use.  For example, the exclamation “oyez” is
spelled as “O Yes” and is defined as follows: “O Yes, (From the Fr.
Oyez, i.e. Audite, hear ye) Is well known to be used by Cryers in our
Courts &c. to injoin Silence and Attention, when they make Procla-
mation of any Thing.”222  In addition to defining terms, Jacob also
sought to provide a summary or “abridgment” of the law.223  The entry
on “usury,” for instance, occupies three columns and discusses sub-
stantive rules prevailing in England.224  Subsequent editions were pub-
lished after Jacob’s death.225  Members of the Supreme Court have
cited various editions of this dictionary.226
4. THOMAS POTTS, A COMPENDIOUS LAW DICTIONARY (1803)227
Thomas Potts, born in 1778, was an English solicitor who was af-
filiated with Skinners’ Hall and Serjeants’ Inn in London and who
compiled several reference books.228  His law dictionary, first pub-
lished in 1803,229 was less comprehensive, but more accessible than the
competing dictionaries.  Potts aimed his dictionary, according to its
preface, at country gentlemen, merchants, and professional men.230  It
contains definitions of many commercial terms.  These definitions are,
in general, easily understandable to lay readers, but do not attempt to
explain the applicable legal rules.  For example, the dictionary defines
a “bill of lading” as “a memorandum, signed by masters of ships, ac-
knowledging the receipt of merchant goods, &c.  Of this there are usu-
221 COWLEY, supra note 207, at xc.
222 JACOB, supra note 217 (entry for “O Yes”).
223 COWLEY, supra note 207, at xc.
224 See JACOB, supra note 217 (entry for “usury”).
225 COWLEY, supra note 207, at xci.
226 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2644 n.1 (2012) (joint
opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (citing the 10th edition published
in 1782); Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 221 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing the
edition published in 1811).
227 THOMAS POTTS, A COMPENDIOUS LAW DICTIONARY (London, T. Ostell 1803), available
at http://books.google.com/books?id=4rQ3AQAAMAAJ.
228 See G. Le G. Norgate & Elizabeth Baigent, Potts, Thomas, in 45 OXFORD DICTIONARY
OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 44–45 (H.C.G. Matthew & Brian Harrison eds. 2004).
229 See id.
230 POTTS, supra note 227, at iv.
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ally three parts; one kept by the consignor, one sent to the consignee,
and one kept by the captain.”231  Justice Thomas has cited this
dictionary.232
231 Id. at 65.
232 United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 50 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
